This article examines issues of transnational migration in the settler-colonial context of Canada. First, I review some of the recent debates about foregrounding Indigeneity and decolonization in anti-racist thought and work, especially in relation to critical and antiracist approaches to migration. The article then moves from this debate to the question of 'our right to be here', the relationship of this right to the treaties, and how migrant rights and treaty relations perspectives might interact in a context that must be informed by Indigenous laws and legal traditions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Born in Ottawa on unceded Algonquin territory to Canadian immigrants from India and the Philippines, I want to acknowledge the territory where this work took place, which is not just Toronto, but also Tkaronto, a Mohawk or Kanienkehaka word, from one of the languages of the Six Nations that make up the Haudenosaunee Confederacy. Toronto and the surrounding territory is also traditionally of the Huron-Wendat people, the Seneca Nation, and the Anishinaabe, specifically the treaty and traditional territory of the Mississaugas of New Credit. 5 Racialized immigrants and Indigenous peoples have been in contact as long as Europeans and Indigenous peoples -the history of this relationship is at least as old as African slavery, the migration north by United Empire Loyalists, the building of the railroad by Chinese migrant labourers, and the transnational labour force of the British Empire from South Asia. For example, African interpreter Matthiew da Costa accompanied Pierre du Gua Sieur de Monts (the first French governor of the settlements) to Acadie in 1604. 6 how Indigenous laws and legal traditions could help to 'decolonize' this right and might open some of the borders that we keep in our minds about these issues. Ultimately, I argue that we can all be treaty people in relations with one another, but only if we are all here to stay.
I also want to note that my use of the five introductory quotations above is an attempt to 'cut the long story short' by showing how people supposedly talking about the same things can do so in very different ways, in an equally wide range of registers. If these quotations are too apocryphal, then the longer story is what follows. The question guiding much of that story seems straightforward enough: what is our right to be here?
II. DECOLONIZATION, THE COMMONS, AND GOLDILOCKS CITIZENSHIP
Encapsulating, in part, larger conversations and debates, the two articles I focus on here are both concerned with decolonization. Published in 2005, Bonita Lawrence (Mi'kmaw) and Ena Dua's article "Decolonizing Antiracism" found a reply from Nandita Sharma and Cynthia Wright in their 2008 article, "Decolonizing Resistance, Challenging Colonial States". 10 In the former, Lawrence & Dua set out to interrogate a brand of liberal, multiculturalist, and disempowering pluralism that they see as an exclusionary feature of contemporary Canadian antiracism. Their starting point at the confluence of indigeneity and antiracism is also, arguably, at the horizon of liberal approaches 11 and even left-legal 12 (or treaty rights) analyses of the respective rights of both migrants and Indigenous peoples. 13 Indeed, Lawrence & Dua note that: "Aboriginal people cannot see themselves in antiracism contexts, and Aboriginal activism against settler domination takes place without people of color as allies"; avoiding such segregated activism would mean that postcolonial/antiracism theorists "begin to take Indigenous decolonization seriously". 14 Both authors proceed to situate their work with and impressions of antiracism, but as an immigrant from India, Dua's initial comments are especially interesting in the context of migration in a settler-colonial context. Dua writes that:
My approach in this article, as someone committed to antiracist feminist struggles, is to examine my complicity in the ongoing project of colonization. My complicity is complex. First, as an inhabitant of Canada, I live in and own land that has been appropriated from Aboriginal peoples. As a citizen of Canada, I have rights and privileges that are denied to Aboriginal peoples collectively, and that are deployed to deny Aboriginal rights to self-government. Second, as someone involved in antiracist and progressive struggles, I wonder about the ways in which the bodies of knowledge that I have worked to build have been framed so This point is developed further in my dissertation, but for the most prominent example, see Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995) at 14-17. 12 On left-legal analysis, see e.g. Linda Bosniak "Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants" (2007) 8 Theor Inq L 389; On treaty rights, see Johnson, supra note 3. 13 For related work, see Amar Bhatia "South of the North" supra note 5, and Amar Bhatia, " ' Dua's recognition of her potentially colonizing presence on the land, and the implications for her right to be here, are likely not the norm for most immigrants and 'new' or 'old' Canadians. Due to the erasure of Indigenous peoples and colonization from much of the international and Canadian literature on antiracism and postcolonial theory, Lawrence & Dua conclude that "antiracism is premised on an ongoing colonial project". 15 They note that this project takes place at both theoretical and practical levels, but that ultimately they seek a possible dialogue between antiracist and Aboriginal activists, which would break the complex complicity of marginalized immigrants whose efforts at becoming full citizens inevitably partakes of ongoing colonialism. 16 This dialogue would ideally take place at the intersection of people and policies across Canada, whether with respect to homogenizing discourses (e.g. the removal of Japanese boats and Aboriginal fishing rights) or 'heterogenizing' developments (black/Mi'kmaw intermarriage). 17 Despite acknowledging the differences amongst slaves, migrant workers, refugees, and émigrés, Lawrence & Dua nonetheless note: "People of color are settlers [… who] live on land that is appropriated and contested, where Aboriginal peoples are denied nationhood and access to their own lands". 18 The parallel history of settlement on 'freed up'/dispossessed land that they review encompasses: Nova Scotia black loyalists, which erases Mi'kmaw/Wabanaki resistance; focus on 'head tax' restrictions that effaces post-1885 Cree and Blackfoot suppression; the adoption of 'colonist' mentality or practice by South Asian, Japanese, and Jewish immigrants to fit the white settler norm; and, the potential voting patterns of citizens of colour on the failed Charlottetown Accord recognizing, among other things, a 'third order' of Aboriginal government. 19 However, Lawrence & Dua direct particular attention to the problems of immigration and the attempted erasure of Indigenous people by multiculturalism as an official policy (which they note was promulgated at the same time as Trudeau's infamous 1969 White Paper/Indian Policy). They are quite wary of statist immigration policy and 'open borders' arguments as hurdles to Aboriginal rights:
Regarding immigration, Aboriginal peoples are caught between a rock and a hard place. Either they are implicated in the anti-immigrant racism of white Canadians, or they support struggles of people of color that fail to take seriously the reality of ongoing colonization. Often overlooked by antiracist activists is that 15 Ibid at 123. 16 Ibid at 133; For a discussion on the difference between complicity and privilege in this context, see Beenash Jafri, "Privilege vs. the Delgamuuk'w decision clearly set out instances in which Aboriginal title could be infringed (i.e., limited or invalidated) by continuing immigration. Canada's immigration goals, then, can be used to restrict Aboriginal rights. Antiracist activists need to think through how their campaigns can preempt the ability of Aboriginal communities to establish title to their traditional lands. Recent tendencies to advocate for open borders make this particularly important. Borders in the Americas are European fictions, restricting Native peoples' passage and that of peoples of color. However, to speak of opening borders without addressing Indigenous land loss and ongoing struggles to reclaim territories is to divide communities that are already marginalized from one another. The question that must be asked is how opening borders would affect Indigenous struggles aimed at reclaiming land and nationhood. 20 Lawrence & Dua's concerns are obviously not unfounded. Indeed, most migrant rights' advocacy or immigration law scholarship adopts policy solutions and points of departure that do not centre Indigenous decolonization. 21 In one of the recent leading works in immigration law by a scholar I greatly admire, the issue of pre-existing communities with attachments to the land as a basis for grounding immigrant rights is relegated (largely unfavourably) to a footnote. 22 Nandita Sharma and Cynthia Wright have undertaken some of this work by responding to Lawrence & Dua. 23 immigration law teaching and scholarship context, Volpp, supra note 9. This absence is confirmed at the more general level of law textbooks approved for use in Ontario secondary schools (see Amar Bhatia, "What Happens to All of Us: Depictions and omissions of Indigenous peoples, nations, and laws in secondary school law textbooks approved for use in Ontario, 1930-2013" (on file with author)) [Bhatia, "What happens to all of us"]. 22 Bosniak, supra note 12 (Bosniak generally advances 'ethical territoriality' or mere territorial presence as the best argument for immigrant rights, and definitely better than relying on formal immigration status for recognition) at 405, note 41 ("An 'attachment to the land' concept does not seem to support the ethical territorial position, because it presupposes an already-existing membership community that maintains an ongoing relationship with the land in question. The ethical territorial view is far more open, holding that the fact of presence within the state's borders, even if or recent vintage, is itself the basis for community membership."). Although tangential to her main argument (which indirectly confirms the absence of Indigenous peoples in immigration law), Bosniak does seem to reinforce the assumption that communities with attachments to the land cannot simultaneously have relationships with newcomers, settlers, im/migrants. I develop this point at greater length in my doctoral dissertation. 30 One example of such bridge-building for paradigm change they mention are the transnational Indigenous migrants who travel from Mexico to work in the United States. 31 The discussion raised by Lawrence & Dua and Sharma & Wright reiterates some of the recurring questions at the heart of my larger doctoral work. At first blush, it is clear that there are no automatic solidarities between 'Indians' and 'Aliens' 32 , but instead that these relationships must be forged, 24 On this point, Sharma & Wright, "Decolonizing Resistance", supra note 10, refer to Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People's History (New York: New Press, 2007) and the failure of the Third World Project in the cocktail of sovereignty and global capitalism, yielding the current desire for decolonization without nationalism. 25 Sharma & Wright, "Decolonizing Resistance", supra note 10 at 123-125; Cf Jace Weaver, Craig S Womack, & Robert Warrior, American Indian Literary Nationalism (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2006), esp. ch 3. 26 Also, see Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1999). See also Johnson, supra note 3 (highlighting ongoing relationships for treaty and non-treaty nations rather than seeking termination). 27 Sharma & Wright, "Decolonizing Resistance", supra note 10 at 126. maintained, storied, and revisited. As noted in a book chapter by Zainab Amadahy and Bonita Lawrence:
One of the questions that emerge from the work described above must be posited to Indigenous peoples: Where do racialized settlers fit in the vision of Indigenous sovereignty? For the purposes of this chapter we need to ask where Black people fit into the vision. This is a huge question. If Indigenous sovereigntists expect Black community support of nation-to-nation negotiation processes regarding land, resources, and reparations, we have to recognize how Blacks become completely disempowered in that process. […] This challenges grassroots Indigenous leadership to develop a vision of sovereignty and self-government that addresses the disempowered and dispossessed from other parts of the world who were forced and/or coerced into being here on Turtle Island (a global phenomenon in which Canada shares culpability). How much support should be expected from communities when there are glaring examples in our midst, such as the expulsion of Black Cherokees in Oklahoma, that there is no guarantee that Black Indians and Black people who lend their support to Indigenous communities will have a place in or beside them? 33
The real tension of the questions raised by Amadahy & Lawrence speaks to the stakes of any potential solutions. Although Sharma & Wright's desire for commoning is appealing in principle, it raises some lingering questions (as would any proposal). In emphasizing an anti-globalization tactic (against neoracism and neoliberalism) via 'commoning', Sharma & Wright potentially focus upon a version of an 'end to history'. 34 These issues have been raised in part, amongst states historically, through the global commons (and common pool resources) at international law, namely: Antarctica, the high seas and deep seabed minerals, the atmosphere, and outer space (including principles such as the common heritage of mankind). 35 More germane to the particular questions of status, authority, and our right to be here already raised, however, is the political and economic project of the commons. To reiterate, and adapting from Peter Linebaugh's 2008 book, The Magna Carta Manifesto, 36 Sharma & Wright propose 33 Lawrence & Amdahy, supra note 6 at 130-131. As discussed below, they also address the framework of the Two Row Wampum for settler-Indigenous co-existence on Turtle Island and how questions arise concerning coexisting with the Canadian state and its ideology at 131. 34 This debate mirrors that found in more 'traditional' approaches to immigration law, which focus on the distinctions found between liberal nationalism and ethical cosmopolitanism. to decolonize both territories and relations through a process of commoning in order to achieve the goal of a global commons (distinct from the inter-state international law sense) 37 and in opposition to enclosures and private property. The four principles of commoning require embedding the decolonization of relations in: 1) the local ecology, without being essentialist; 2) the labour process, so that the commons is entered into through labour; 3) a collective process, and 4) processes that are independent of the state and the law, operating without sovereigns and instead relying on the principles of neighbourhood, subsistence, travel, anti-enclosure, and reparations. 38 As noted, although the goal is a worthy one, the means for achieving it raise some questions. 39 For instance, given the historical concentration of most im/migrants potentially encompassed by commoning in and around Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, and (more recently) cities and employers in the Prairies, it is not clear which labourers or principles would govern the rest of the post-Canadian commons. The lack of labourers or principles outside of the traditional immigration magnets is especially striking in a context meant to be embedded in local ecology through collective processes, yet without the input of Indigenous peoples, nations or legal traditions.
Another key question is whether labour should be the only grounds for entering the commons, especially where the distinctions between what has been productive, versus unproductive, versus reproductive, will likely not disappear on their own in the absence of the state and/or law. 40 Indeed, these divisions have structured the colonial legacy and dispossession (through prescription and alienation) of Indigenous lands through contested but consequential notions of productive agriculture by positively mobile settlers (Lockean labour mixed with the land) and unproductive seasonal rounds by negatively mobile Indigenous peoples. 41 The work of familial and social reproduction has been a similar source of division, control, and precarity domestically 42 and with respect to migration, as evidenced by people; and where the wider community understood the value and, indeed, the necessity of the commons" (notes omitted)). 37 Cf Mickelson, supra note 30 at 118-119 (re Bedjaoui, Common Heritage of Mankind, and the attempt at worldwide solidarity by extending the concept to resources within national sovereignty e.g. oil). 38 See Sharma & Wright, "Decolonizing Resistance", supra note 10 and the original in Linebaugh, supra note 37. 39 See also Bridget Anderson, Nandita Sharma & Cynthia Wright "We Are All Foreigners: No Borders as a practical political project" in Peter Nyers & Kim Rygiel, eds, Citizenship, Migrant Activism and the Politics of Movement (New York: Routledge, 2012) at 85-86 (for another iteration of this argument for the commons and common rights to travel and stay, among others, as part of the authors' proposal for 'no borders' in the immigration context). 40 On a related point see Bhatia, "In A Settled Country", supra note 13 at notes 36-37 (re Jennifer Gordon's proposal for transnational labour citizenship and Leah Vosko's critique of its own 'borders' and inaccessibility). including reproduction from day to day of its members as well as the production of new human beings. In liberal economic orders, it is an importance source of social security. In modern capitalism, it is a crucial site of consumption" in 'Households as an Institution of the World-Economy' in Wallerstein & Smith, eds., Creating and Transforming the treatment of racialized, so-called low-skill migrant workers and their membership (or lack thereof) in Canadian society, whether as domestic workers, service workers, or farmworkers. 43 There is no guarantee that a move to the practice of commoning would avoid what I would call 'Goldilocks' or 'Just Right' citizenship. Currently, this 'goldilocks citizenship' casts some people (such as Indigenous peoples) as having been here too long, while others (such as migrant workers) are seen as not having been here long enough, and still more are just right or have been here long enough to be the authorities on citizenship and belonging. 44 And the measure of what makes them 'just right' is whether their work has been accorded staying power in the economy, by the state, in stories, or in law, as part of a productive and profitable struggle against nature and unimproved land, set apart from women and the home, and against the wrong kinds of mobility. Goldilocks citizenship does not encompass the mobility of seasonal rounds or movement across traditional territories by Indigenous peoples and nations. 45 Magically, it also does not arise from some who mix their labour with the soil, at least in the case of migrant farm workers who gain neither property nor citizenship status from the sweat of their brows. 46 As seen from the above, different frames of work and mobility determine legal and political standing in relation to the land and, in turn, whose economies, polities, and societies get to be reproduced both now and later (whether in a pre-or post-commons Canada). These issues relate to the struggles of both Indigenous peoples and migrant workers and would need to inform processes of global commoning beyond a general entry via labour. Interestingly, historian Peter Linebaugh focuses on a variety of contributors to a history and future of commoning in North America and beyond, including Indigenous peoples:
Commoning as associated with Indians, African Americans, industrial workers, and women has on occasion alluded to Magna Carta, so we have a double task -to reveal how commoning has been exercised Households: the Constraints of the World Economy (1992)). Indeed, Linebaugh goes so far as to note that the "anti-enclosure struggles of Native Americans are fundamental to the ecology and landscape of American history". 48 Relatedly, it is worth noting here that historian Alan Greer cautions against romanticizing the commons, since he argues that the enclosure of America by colonizers took place as a form of commoning in the context of a clash between Indigenous and colonial commons, leading to the dispossession of the former. 49 However, without pre-judging the matter, it is precisely this clash and competition of commons that must be examined. Clearly, whether that of Sharma & Wright, Linebaugh, Neeson, or Greer, there is no version of communing that will be free from conflict. And if, as noted by Marx above, 50 the original sources of all wealth are the worker and the soil, or the labourer and the land, then the redistribution sought through commoning, and on behalf of workers, migrant workers, and Indigenous peoples, also must contend with the issue of the treaties, which underpin workers' status as well as grant access to supposedly shared lands. One element that runs through the foregoing debate, and many of the referenced authors, is uncertainty about Indigenous nations, laws, and legal traditions and acknowledging them as sources of authority. 51 The next section of this article examines some of these controversies, both real and speculative, about Indigenous authority over immigration. The final section and conclusion of the article attempt to advance a more optimistic interpretation, where future attempts at decolonizing territories and relations need not necessarily rely solely on decontextualized commoning or completely open borders or no borders, given their respective histories of violence and current neoliberal economic globalization. 52 Instead, Indigenous legal traditions of hospitality through adoption and treaty might be among the many local and grounded ways that these recurring questions of borders, sovereignty, and membership might be more fruitfully addressed here and in the global contexts that contribute to our local constructs. 53 47 Linebaugh, supra note 36 at 245 (see also Chapter 11). 48 Ibid at 249. 53 See also Bhatia, "South of the North", supra note 5 and Bhatia, "In A Settled Country", supra note 13.
III. STORIES OF EXCLUSION & BELONGING: NOT ONE OF THE TWO FAMILIES
What would Indigenous authority over immigration look like, and how might these visions speak to some of the tensions, potential conflicts, and uncertainties raised above?
Here is one of the worst-case scenarios: the government consults (whether voluntarily or according to the duty to consult required by the 'honour of the Crown') with Aboriginal peoples over the mix and levels of immigration to Canada, with the reported result being a general desire to maintain or reduce immigration targets, followed by a sprinkling of dated quotes or discarded resolutions by Aboriginal leaders about supposedly closing the borders or freezing immigration until the government meets its existing responsibilities. 54 The exclusionary sentiments from such a seemingly 'ground breaking' neoliberal federal consultation with First Nations on immigration fits the fearful vision of Indigenous nationalism mentioned above. But for Indigenous peoples, the much longer-running exclusions arising consequent to family decisions under the Indian Act are more than just a vision; they are a reality. While not usually considered 'immigration', this reality is clear in the issue of kinship and the 'invidious' historical marrying-out and current 'second-generation cut-off' provisions of the Indian Act and delegated and devolved decision-making over band membership and Indigenous National citizenship codes. 55 Apart from its 'Indian' policies, the issue of migration as kinship migration looms large in the Canadian state's external immigration policies as well. 56 However, these Indian Act tactics are also the product of the Crown and the state's avowed policy and strategy of assimilation and 'extinction by numbers' 57 through existing and proposed Aboriginal legislation, whether in the Indian Act or proposed pushes to privatize reserve lands as alienable 'fee simple' title lands 58 . Even more so, these policies are also the Canadian state's active foreclosure of the self-determination of Indigenous nations and communities and, ultimately, their ability to survive and reproduce themselves socially and politically (as Canada does) through inter-marriage, procreation, and immigration.
To counter-balance these worst-case scenarios, it is worth returning to a point raised rejected the notion that Aboriginal title was merely a license to use and occupy land or that its content was limited to traditional uses of the land. 60 The test for justifying infringement of Aboriginal rights has two parts: furtherance of a compelling and substantial legislative objective and whether or not the infringement is consistent with the special fiduciary relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. Citing R. v. Gladstone, 61 , Lamer C.J. notes that there is a "fairly broad" range of objectives that could justify infringing aboriginal title:
In my opinion, the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to support those aims, are the kinds of objectives that are consistent with this purpose and, in principle, can justify the infringement of aboriginal title. Whether a particular measure or government act can be explained by reference to one of those objectives, however, is ultimately a question of fact that will have to be examined on a case-by-case basis.
[emphasis added] 62
Many of these potentially justifiable infringements of Aboriginal title emerge through the extractive industries and the associated need for the migration of labour (within, across and outside of Canada) to support such extraction. 63 The Supreme Court of Canada has recently confirmed this broad range of justifiable infringements. 64 With this in mind, who do Indigenous peoples seem to keep out? After all, the image of borders closed by Indigenous peoples to racialized migrants from the global South is not front of mind. Instead, some of the biggest boundaries asserted by Indigenous peoples and nations are not against people, but corporations (and representative governments that are just not that representative). 65 A short list of blockades and occupations in defence of land, whether on reserve, or treaty, traditional, or unceded territories, includes: Elsipogtog, Aamjiwnang, Tayendinega, Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug, Algonquins of Barriere Lake, the Haudenosaunee at Caledonia, Secwepmec at Sun Peaks, Mohawks at 59 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 111. Kahnesetake, at Ipperwash, with the Lubicon Cree, at Gustafsen lake, at Cape Croker with Chippewas of Nawash, the Nu-cha-nulth at Clayoquout Sound, the Anishinabek at Grassy Narrows, the Yinka Dene Alliance and Northern Gateway pipeline, and on. 66 In addition to these stories of anti-enclosure and anti-corporate immigration, 67 it will be important in the articulation of how Indigenous laws and legal traditions might inform Canadian immigration (or post-Canadian access to the commons) to note some positive stories as well. This type of story telling, in addition to more formal education efforts, 68 is necessary in order to counteract those other ideas that are just lying around.
Of course, the situation is much more complicated than simply worst-case scenarios or direct action against corporate and state extraction of resource wealth. For example, there is the privatized ability of First Nations as employers in Ontario and other provinces (as with other employers) to use the Provincial Nominee Program to nominate, fast-track, and (as employers) sponsor immigrants to live and work in their communities and eventually acquire Canadian permanent resident status. Other examples that complicate the picture further include Chinese-First Nations relations in British Columbia and Coast, Straits, and Interior Salish territories. 69 Historically, these relations included stories of 'sanctuary' being provided to migrant Chinese railroad workers by Coast Salish peoples from their persecution by white Canadian workers and bosses. 70 Another story relates to Musqueam-Chinese elder 66
IV. WE ARE ALL TREATY PEOPLE… BUT ONLY IF WE ARE ALL HERE TO STAY
As noted above, the idea of a 'treaty right to be here' 79 emerges from several sources, including Harold Johnson's book, Two Families 80 , but also, importantly, the work of Sa´ke´j Henderson (2002) . 81 Other prominent examples that 'We Are All Treaty People' range from the statement by Justice Linden in the Ipperwash Inquiry Report, 82 and similar statements by Nihiyow (Treaty Six) international legal scholar Sharon Venne, 83 80 Johnson, supra note 3. 81 Sákéj Henderson, supra note 79 at 417-433 (citizenship presence relies and depends on treaties, in relation to Aboriginal legal orders and traditions, which did not have the concept of strangers so much as everyone was a guest; treaties remain the original constitution of Canada; and learning to belong to the territory or ecology). [cf Linebaugh, supra note 37]. 
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Underlying all of these articulations, even the satirical, is the recognition that a relationship exists, that it underpins continued presence on the land, and that it cannot be extinguished. The quality of the relationship can be summarized in this way: "We desire the fullest, richest, and most interesting and mutually beneficial relationship possible in the least obtrusive and most congenial way possible, to engage the being/phenomenon -its history, its condition, and its conduct in relation to ourselves. […] We imagine that this desire for relationship might be driven by our mutual right to be." 87 In his book, Two Families, written in response to a law student's request, Nihiyow (Cree) lawyer Harold Johnson takes an uncommon starting point when looking at the diversity of peoples in Canada and their respective rights to be here. 88 Writing from a northern Cree perspective and a small territory in the centre of Saskatchewan (the 1889 adhesion to Treaty No. 6), Johnson initially notes where he is from and that he does not and cannot "speak for all Aboriginal peoples." 89 He also follows the relational approach of Cree law: "Kiciwamanawak, my cousin: that is what my Elders said to call you. When your family came here and asked to live with us on this territory, we agreed. We adopted you in a ceremony that your family and mine call treaty. […] At Treaty No. 6 the Cree adopted the Queen and her children. We became relatives." 90 Johnson relates this legal history of the ceremony of treaty, which were "adoptions of one nation by another" under Cree law, 91 in order to explain the consistencies and potential coexistence of Cree and Canadian supreme laws. This 'familiarization' of the treaty process is geared towards a shift away from privileging pieces of paper (e.g. the Constitution; federalprovincial resource transfer agreements) 92 in order to perceive the actual and ideal relationships between 88 Johnson, supra note 3 at 13. 89 Ibid at 11. 90 Ibid at 13. As noted in the prefatory endorsement letter from elected Chief Lionel Bird (Montreal Lake Cree Nation), Johnson's use of "the inclusive 'Kiciwamanawak' in the discussion formally introduces him as the speaker for all of us to all of you. If he were to use Niciwamak, he would be speaking only for himself to all of you." While endorsed by the Montreal Lake Cree, this endorsement of course does not extend to or speak for all Aboriginal people. 91 Ibid. 92 See ibid at 90 ("my family did not adopt a piece of paper") and at 92 (non-abrogation of treaties by Constitution, since treaties are the source of Canadian justification to be here and have a constitution in the first place). two groups of people, to "suggest how we might live together as two families sharing the same territory. I will never suggest that you go back where you came from, for I assure you, Kiciwamanawak, that you have a treaty right to be here." 93 Johnson goes into further detail on this point of familial, national adoption later in the book:
When your ancestors came to this territory, Kiciwamanawak, our law applied. When your ancestors asked to share this territory, it was in accordance with our law that my ancestors entered into an agreement with them. It was by the law of the Creator that they had the authority to enter treaty. The Creator gave us several ceremonies through which we experience, learn, and practice the law of the Creator. One of these ceremonies is for adoption. While your law is divided into several areas -tort, property, criminal, contract, taxation -our law is primarily concerned with the maintenance of harmonious relations. […] It was in accordance with the law of adoption that my family took your ancestors as relatives. We solemnized the adoption with a sacred pipe. The promises that my ancestors made are forever, because they were made under the Creator's law. This adoption ceremony is what we refer to when we talk about the treaty. 94 Unlike dominant approaches in liberal theory, Johnson begins with the application of Cree law, the Crown's request to share the territory, and the irrevocable adoption through treaty of the ancestors of those who are now the inheritors of Canadian settler state sovereignty.
Rather than starting by assessing the legitimacy of special self-government rights for national minorities 95 , Johnson looks at the legitimacy of the state that purports to grant these rights in the first place. In reviewing section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, 96 Johnson responds with the following:
Kiciwamanawak, your Constitution is only how your family will run itself. It is not the supreme law of this territory. Your Constitution is subservient to and dependent of the treaties for its legitimacy. There is no other legitimate basis for your occupation and use of this territory. It is only by treaty that you have any rights here at all. […] If there is any supreme law, it must be the law of adoption. If your family and mine are going to live in this territory together, with truth and honesty, we have to live as relatives. Sorry, Kiciwamanawak, you're stuck with me. 97 In this passage, Johnson puts forward a radical vision and the fundamental link drawn between the mutual adoption of treaty -the health of that permanent relationship between the two families -and the ongoing legitimacy of the Canadian state and the rights of its citizens to be here. 98 Perhaps obviously, but still important to note, Johnson does not approach Cree law and treaties from their absence or their erasure. 93 Ibid at 14 (emphasis added). 94 Ibid at 27. 95 Contrast with e.g. Kymlicka, supra note 11. 96 "The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect." Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982 97 Johnson, supra note 3 at 105 (emphasis added). Johnson makes the same point throughout the book. For example, in discussing s. 25(b), Johnson notes that "This section of the Constitution is written backwards: it is your family that derives rights from treaty" at 100. 98 Whether this vision is one of radical legal pluralism, or instead radical incommensurability, remains to be seen. See Eve Tuck & K Wayne Yang, "Decolonization is not a metaphor" (2012) 1:1 Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 1 at 13-17.
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While an important improvement in terms of shifting away from an approach that might only reify the state to the exclusion of other sources of power and authority, how does the relational acknowledgment of our treaty right to be here (to have any rights at all) address the concerns raised by racialized settlers and migrants from the global South? As noted by Amadahy & Lawrence in the context of the (now 400-year-old) Gus-Wen-Tah or Two Row Wampum, which set the frame for many treaty relations that followed:
Further questions emerge regarding the framework of the Two Row Wampum, often referred to as the agreement that sets out how settlers and Indigenous people are supposed to coexist on Turtle Island. The wampum belt depicts two parallel rows of lavender beads running the belt's length. Elders tell us this symbolizes that White settlers and Indigenous people agreed to sail in their canoes or boats down the waterway respecting and not interfering with each others' progress nor interfering with each others' communities (another "treaty" not kept). The notion that Indigenous nations can coexist with the Canadian state, whose ideology, values, and institutions lead to the poisoning of the air, water, and land that we all depend on; that forms the basis of our identities and cultures, is increasingly coming into question. 99 Although it is largely tangential to his greater argument and he spends only a small portion of the book on the issue, Johnson does write about two places that could address racialized settlers and migrants of colour.
First, in his reading of section 27 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which reads as follows: "Multicultural heritage: This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians." 100 However, Johnson immediately emphasizes: "My family are not the same as other minority groups within your family. We are happy that many people from different parts of the world have come to live here. They are as welcome as you are." 101 This distinction is interesting because noting that immigrants "are as welcome as you are" implies two things: 1) settlers are newcomers, too, despite their attribution of 'newness' to immigrants only; 2) immigrants are no less (or more) welcome than those who have come before. Johnson goes on to modify this relative stance of welcome through the reality of treaty, which is worth quoting at length here:
My family adopted your family at treaty. We did not adopt or make treaty with those who are now minorities within your family. To my family, the minorities are all members of your family. They are your responsibility. You adopted them through your ceremony of immigration and naturalization. To the extent that they are your relatives through adoption, they are also our relatives, because you and I are related.
Your family has developed a huge body of law in relation to minorities. You have sought to find peace among yourselves. If my family accepts designation as a minority group, then we would put ourselves under that body of law. I am not in any way criticizing your treatment of minorities, Kiciwamanawak. I am simply stating that my family has a different relationship with you. We have a treaty relationship. Our 99 See Lawrence & Amadahy, supra note 6 at 131; cf Sehdev, supra note 83 at 273 (need to "focus attention on decolonizing treaty" from historical artifacts to processes of "making and keeping good relations") but see also Tuck and Yang, ibid and references on One Dish treaty, supra note 5. 100 Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 97. 101 Johnson, supra note 3 at 100 (emphasis added).
differences must be worked out in accordance with the treaties and not through your law in relation to minorities. 102 For Johnson, immigrants (among others) are members, and the responsibility, of Canada first, adopted through the ceremonies of immigration and naturalization. Membership in the Canadian family in turn leads to a relationship with Johnson's family due to the two families' treaties. However, this membership of minorities could be something less than the position of those who are descendants of the original treaty partners. He further segments the hierarchy of laws: treaty relationship between two families versus the one family's body of law in relation to minorities. While Johnson's desire to draw distinctions from minorities and the many people from different parts of the world who have come to live in Canada is understandable given the history of assimilation that characterizes government and non-government approaches to both groups, 103 it does not necessarily address the concerns of those who have not yet been adopted by Canada.
More specifically, Johnson appears to characterize minorities -for whom Canada is responsible -as those who are already full members through immigration and naturalization.
Behind this characterization, there is an assumption that such minorities have had a consensual process of adoption into the Canadian family that is analogous to the treaty relationship described between Johnson's family and the Canadian family. The issues of full membership and consensual relationships, versus precarious, temporary, and non-status people in coerced and forced migration, cannot be so easily assumed. This assumption by Johnson is similar to the footnoting of 'pre-existing communities with attachments to the land' in Bosniak and (as shown by Volpp) that is characteristic of immigration law and scholarship more generally. The incomplete picture in Aboriginal law and treaty rights (directed at the Canadian state and its citizens as treaty partners and people carrying rights and responsibilities) is mirrored in the silos of immigration law (directed at the Canadian state as the sole authority on the right to be here and stay here). As noted above, Lawrence & Dua and Sharma & Wright's work seeks to move beyond these divides in the best of the critical anti-racist and Indigenous scholarship outside of law. However, this literature also demonstrated a further gap with respect to the place and authority of Indigenous laws and legal traditions in a context faced with these simultaneous (not necessarily competing) demands. I do not want to over-determine Johnson's brief discussion of immigrants in the context of his larger and powerful argument about treaties and treaty relations. However, it is also worth noting that he is keenly aware of the difference that citizenship determination makes, even if it is not reflected in his uncritical 104 approach to Canadian citizenship and immigration law.
For example, Johnson critiques the underlying assumption of subsection 35(2) of the Constitution, which "purports to determine the Aboriginal peoples of Canada as the Indian, Inuit, and Metis peoples. Kiciwamanawak, you haven't the right to tell anyone who they are. It is not for you to decided who is cannot be construed as a treaty right to undermine the treaties, whether directly, by preventing the maintenance and growth of Indigenous nations (e.g. marrying out or second-generation cut-off rules) or indirectly, by hoarding permanent status from low-skilled migrant workers and others. So, if we are all treaty people, and have a treaty right to be here, then these words, and the rights and responsibilities envisioned in living treaty relations, only have meaning if we are truly all here to stay (contrary to Lamer C.J.'s assumption). At the least, I believe that such an understanding requires recognizing both inherent and shared authority by Indigenous peoples and nations over immigration to unceded and shared territories. As noted above, I am not simply talking about another layer of actual or pseudoconsultation on the 'levels and mix' in the immigration targets developed annually by Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Fundamentally, it could be shared authority arising from treaty relations, respectful of treaty rights and responsibilities, in shared and traditional territories, and inherent rights in unceded territories, all informed by Indigenous laws and legal traditions not constrained solely by the choices presented by settler colonialism and neoliberal economic globalization. As noted with respect to the potential of commoning discussed above, my argument undoubtedly raises more questions than answers. 110 At least, however, it attempts to avoid the disciplinary segregation described above and counts Indigenous political and legal traditions among the key sources of authority in these questions and answers.
V. INDIGENOUS LEGAL TRADITIONS AND CITIZENSHIP WITH THE LAND
On this point, I have to note that there is no way to do justice here to the vast array of Indigenous laws and legal traditions that exist (notwithstanding ongoing structures of settler-colonialism 111 ), both for lack of knowledge and for lack of space. For the sake of brevity, logic, and also reality, I will work from the assumption (asserted by Borrows, and Napoleon & Friedland) that Indigenous laws and legal traditions do, in fact, exist and have done so for a long time, defined by their diversity, continuity, repression, survival, and adaptability. 112 Recent work on Indigenous legal traditions is especially striking given the relatively recent rarity of published scholarship on state-based Aboriginal law (let alone Indigenous laws) in the late sixties and early seventies. 113 More specifically, this new research and writing has been explicit in recognizing and naming specific Indigenous legal traditions and Vol. 31(2) Indigeneity, Migration, And 'Decolonizing' The Treaty Right To Be Here 63 be learned and adopted by others 'with some effort', which could ultimately lead to consideration of "implementing laws consistent with these traditions to extend citizenship in Aboriginal communities to non-Aboriginal people". 124 In fact, for Borrows, this extension of citizenship, flowing from Aboriginal control of Canadian affairs that are important to and impact on Aboriginal people, is inherently tied to continuing Anishinaabe citizenship with the land. He notes that Indigenous peoples still participate in their traditional territories, notwithstanding the borders and boundaries of reserves, relying on them for food, water, medicine, memories, friends, and work. 125 Aboriginal control of Canadian affairs thus "… provides a discourse which simultaneously recognizes the meaningful participation of Aboriginal people with one another, and with their non-Aboriginal neighbours. It contains a deeper commitment to preserve and extend the special relationship Aboriginal peoples have with the land." 126 This deep commitment to preserve and extend the special relationship with the land -the openness of landed citizenship informed by the teaching of 'All My Relations' -speaks to a new law of immigration or adoption. Of course, it is not new under Anishinaabe law, but it would be new under treaty codetermination, shared authority in shared territories (traditional or otherwise) with Canada, and inherent rights in unceded lands over immigration to Turtle Island. Furthermore, the admission to membership of individuals and families posited by Borrows echoes the larger scale adoption of groups, communities, and nations via treaty relationship under Nihiyow law articulated by Johnson, as well as the Haudenosaunee Kaianerekowa in the "Laws of Adoption". 127 The existence of living legal traditions of Indigenous nations, in conjunction with treaties/laws of adoption as the supreme laws of the land, underpin my argument for the necessity of questioning the Canadian state's monopoly over access, status, and belonging in the contexts of Canadian immigration and Indigenous self-determination. Living in relationship with one another on shared territories makes this a matter of common sense, as does recognizing that unjustly temporary or precarious immigration status only undermines treaties and treaty relations. And, although it remains to be seen, Indigenous immigration laws need not replicate the exclusions of Canadian immigration laws or the Indian Act or Indian Act-like band membership codes 128 . These different sources and examples of Indigenous laws of making and keeping relations can serve as means for Indigenous societies to "keep their legal traditions alive and connected to broader normative bases" through living communities. 129 These are positive reasons to begin to work towards answering these questions. As I have noted above, negative reasons exist as well, such as the fact that the Canadian state continually seeks the restriction of status Indigenous populations in concert with private sector exploitation of Indigenous reserve, treaty,
